










Frans af Malmborg and
Jarle Trondal
University of Agder, Norway
Abstract
The purpose of this article is twofold: to theoretically assess ideational and organiza-
tional explanatory factors in the adoption of artificial intelligence policies; and to exam-
ine the extent to which the European Union has managed to facilitate a coordinated
artificial intelligence policy in the Nordic countries. The study utilizes a mixed-methods
approach based on systematic web searching, systematic policy document analysis and
key informant semi-structured interviews. The study finds that the European Union has
utilized framing-based strategies to set an agenda for a coordinated European artificial
intelligence policy. Moreover, the strategy has affected member-state artificial intelli-
gence policies to the extent that key tenets of European Union artificial intelligence
discourse have penetrated Nordic public documents. However, the extent to which the
Nordic countries incorporate European Union artificial intelligence policy discourse
diverges at the national level. Differentiated national organizational capacities among
Nordic countries make the adoption of artificial intelligence policies divergent. This
observation is theoretically accounted for through a conversation between organiza-
tional theory of public governance and discursive institutionalism. The study argues that
the framing of European Union artificial intelligence policies is filtered through organi-
zational structures among states.
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The study illuminates how policymakers in the Nordic countries are affected by the
European Union when crafting their own artificial intelligence policies. The European
Commission profoundly influences the policymaking of member states and affiliated
states through the policy strategy of policy framing. The Commission uses this soft
measure to nudge member states to comply with the European Union policy frame-
work. Second, the study shows how ‘organizations matter’: variation in national orga-
nizational capacities in the Nordic states contributes to variation in national policy
adoption. Even though Nordic countries adopt European Union-level policy frames,
their implementation is shaped by varying organizational capacities available at the
national level.
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Introduction
The exponential increase in business investment, research and development (R&D)
and the technical performance of artificial intelligence (AI) (Perrault et al., 2019)
has impelled the idea that AI is central to the ‘fourth industrial revolution’
(Schwab, 2017). A contemporary notion is to believe that AI will transform
both modern societies and science at scale (Appenzeller, 2017; Harari, 2017).
Such transformative potential is also echoed within the discourse on ‘smart gov-
ernment’ and ‘big data’, in which opportunities often seem endless (Maciejewski,
2017; Siugzdinien _e et al., 2019). This has initiated a stark worldwide increase in
soft policy, such as ethical guidelines and AI strategies (Jobin et al., 2019).
International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union
(EU) have all started developing AI soft policy. This study argues that the EU,
more specifically, the European Commission (Commission), applies soft measures
of policy framing in the domains of AI and accordingly sets member states to
adopt a common EU-level policy frame. By examining member-state AI policies,
this study thus asks to what extent the Commission managed to facilitate a coor-
dinated policy framework within the member states.
In 2018, the Commission launched its first policy document on AI, which was a
first attempt to frame a common European policy approach to strengthen
Europe’s global position on AI (European Commission, 2018a). In the subsequent
coordinated plan released the same year, member states were encouraged to devel-
op their own national AI strategies by mid-2019, which should outline investment
levels and implementation measures, taking the coordinated plan into account.
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Although the exact content and form was left for the member states to decide,
national strategies should build on what was outlined in the coordinated plan
(European Commission, 2018b). Adopting a disruptive AI narrative, the coordi-
nated plan states that ‘AI is helping us to solve some of the world’s biggest
challenges: from treating chronic diseases or reducing fatality rates in traffic acci-
dents to fighting climate change or anticipating cybersecurity threats’ (European
Commission, 2018b: 2). The transformative potential of these technologies is
(apparently) profound. A collaborative document on AI was also signed the
same year by all EU member states, including Norway. The document suggests
that signatories should coordinate their AI efforts, continuously facilitate a dia-
logue with the Commission and commit to regular assessments on progress. The
agreed-upon document suggested member states commit to boost uptake in a
range of AI-related areas, such as research, education and industrial processes
(European Commission, 2018c). To further promote the urgency of addressing
AI as a policy issue, the Commission set up the High-Level Expert Group on AI
(AIHLEG) in June 2018, tasked with supporting the implementation of a coordi-
nated EU approach and providing policy recommendations for member states.
However, as great expectations in Brussels might easily be dashed in member
states, the aim of this article is to determine to what extent member states created
AI strategies that build on the EU policy approach on AI. Zooming in on the
Nordic region, the article examines AI strategies and organizational policy context
in five Nordic countries through expert interviews with key government officials,
systematized online data collection and analysis of AI policy documents. While
earlier research has shown a ‘Nordic cluster’, with similarities and overlap of AI
strategies (van Berkel et al., 2020), relations with the EU are differentiated. Iceland
and Norway are merely associated members of the EU via the European Economic
Area (EEA), while Sweden, Denmark and Finland are EU members. We would
thus expect territorial variation among the Nordic states in their adoption of the
EU’s AI policy. Moreover, the Nordic EU member states have also been described
as reluctant and awkward partners in the EU (Stegmann and Brianson, 2018),
exemplified most recently by the ‘frugal four’ opposing some key aspects of the
EU’s COVID-19 recovery fund. Are Nordic states also reluctant adopters of the
AI policy of the EU? By applying a theoretical framework that combines ideation-
al and organizational aspects, this study contributes to building bridges within
(new) institutionalist scholarship. The article exemplifies this theoretical bridge
by observing that national AI policies in the Nordic countries are ideationally
integrated into the AI policy of the EU but still differentiated in their organiza-
tional adoption of it due to variation in organizational capacities.
The article is structured as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical
framework on policy framing and organizational capacities. Then, the mixed meth-
odology applied and the data that have been made available to the study are
presented. Lastly, we present key findings and conclude by revisiting the theoret-
ical framework.
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Policy ideas and organizational capacities
To reconcile divergent institutionalist approaches and to move beyond conven-
tional notions such as ‘organizations matter’ and ‘ideas matter’, this study shows
both how ideas and organizations structure policy adoption, and at what points in
the policy process they do. The novelty, increasing interest and sometimes hype
surrounding AI technologies provides an important ideational backdrop for our
study. Even though AI technologies are, to a large extent, not yet applied, AI
policies are already shaping at scale (Jobin et al., 2019), showing that the poten-
tially disruptive effects of these technologies are apparently sufficient to mobilize
policymakers at various levels. At the same time, as governments assign staff and
resources to produce these policies, the policies also become products of their
organizational capacities. Therefore, in studying AI policy adoption in the EU,
we argue that ideational framing-based processes spur policy change while orga-
nizational capacities influences the scope and depth of national implementation.
As such, policy ideas are conceptualized as the independent variable, organization-
al capacities as the main mediating variable and national AI policy adoption as the
dependent variable (Figure 1).
Independent variable: AI as a policy idea
A vast scholarship has explored ideational and constructive processes as potential
explanatory concepts in the study of public policy (Beland, 2009; Beland and Cox,
2011; Blyth, 2002; Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016; Fischer and Forester, 1993;
Parsons, 2002; Schmidt, 2010). Intrinsically malleable and subject to constant
reforming and reframing (Carstensen, 2011), far from all ideas have political
impact. Ideas need to be promoted by policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1995),
address a critical issue in a seemingly useful way (Hall, 1993) and be framed for
broad institutional and normative acceptance (Campbell, 2004). AI is indeed a
critical issue and we conceptualize the Commission as a sufficiently powerful
policy entrepreneur to frame the AI issue in such a way that incites member







Figure 1. The causal model illustrated
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Commission, 2018a), coordinated plan (European Commission, 2018b), coordina-
tion document (European Commission, 2018c) and AIHLEG all represent initia-
tives aimed at coordinating member states’ AI policies. As policy issues are neither
neutrally given nor a priori defined, we conceptualize these initiatives as efforts of
the Commission to frame the issue, that is, to emphasize certain policy elements
and define policy problems, which, in turn, also sets an agenda and biases the
policy processes (Daviter, 2007, 2018). As a policy entrepreneur, the Commission
has the power to set up ‘normative-prescriptive stories that interpret an uncertain,
problematic, or controversial situation into a policy problem that names the phe-
nomenon and implies a course of action’ (Laws and Rein, 2003: 174). As such, the
framing of the AI issue bears similarity to the ‘low politics route’ of agenda setting:
the utilization of expert groups and formulation of specific policy proposals
(Princen and Rhinard, 2006).
Building on work from Carstensen and Schmidt (2016), we suggest that such
ideational power is a distinct form of power characterized by the capacity of cer-
tain actors to influence other actors’ beliefs and actions through influencing the
ideational context that defines the range of possibilities of action. In the specific
context, this translates to the fact that the Commission has encouraged member
states to create national AI strategies that should outline investment levels and
implementation measures that should build on the coordinated plan of the
Commission. In line with our theoretical expectations, EU-level policy frames
can therefore have the power to reduce policy uncertainty and facilitate coordina-
tion by member states, fitted to constructed policy notions (Blyth, 2002).
The articulation of forceful ideas in policy has been described as discursive self-
authorization and is a key part in how future-oriented discourse has the potential
to bias public organizations and governments towards certain policy outcomes
(Schattschneider, 1975; P€alli et al., 2009). The framing of the EU’s AI policies is
thus expected to shape the formulations and perceptions of national policymakers.
The setting up of the AIHLEG, the declaration of cooperation among member
states and the EU coordinated plan are thus all considered to be ways for the
Commission to frame the ‘AI issue’. The emphasis of AI as a disruptive technology
that is ‘helping us to solve some of the world’s biggest challenges’ (European
Commission, 2018b: 2) furthermore bestows the policy with discursive force, sig-
nificance and temporal urgency. Such ideas translated into policy texts are then
invoked as normative premises for member states to establish policies to address
AI technology and harness its potential. Implicitly, this means that if a member
state does not develop AI policy strategies, this member state is assumed to miss
the transformative potential offered by AI technologies. From this line of argu-
ment, we derive our first proposition:
P1: National policymakers are likely to be influenced by EU-level AI policy ideas,
leading to national policy adoption.
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Mediating variable: organizational capacity
Policy adoption is assumed to be mediated by the requisite organizational capac-
ities available. An organizational approach is grounded on the assumption that
organizational characteristics may explain both how organizations act and how
they change. An organizational approach in this study emphasizes how decision
processes and human behaviour respond to a set of fairly stable organizational
routines (Cyert and March, 1963). Essentially, stable premises for behavioural
choices are past experiences encoded in rules and expressed in the organizational
structure of a government apparatus (Frederickson et al., 2012; Olsen, 2017;
Waldo, 1952). Organizational characteristics of the governmental apparatus sys-
tematically enable and constrain public governance processes, making some policy
choices more likely than others. A theory of organization is thus also a theory of
politics (Waldo, 1952). Among other things, organizational capacities mobilize
attention and action capacity around certain problems and solutions while ignor-
ing others, as well as focus attention along particular lines of conflict and coop-
eration (Simon, 1983: 21). An organizational approach posits that organizational
capacities are not merely expressions of symbolic politics (Feldman and March,
1981; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), but create systematic bias in human behaviour
and collective decision processes by directing and nudging individual and collective
choices towards certain problems and solutions, thereby making certain outcomes
more plausible than others (Egeberg and Trondal, 2020; Fligstein, 2001; Gulick,
1937; Hammond, 1986; Schattschneider, 1975; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
Contemporary studies in organization theory focus particularly on the explan-
atory role of organizational structure (Egeberg, 2012; Egeberg and Trondal, 2018).
An organizational structure is a normative structure, that is, it is a decided order
composed of rules and roles specifying who is expected to do what, when and how
(Ahrne and Brunsson, 2019; Egeberg and Trondal, 2018; Scott and Davis, 2016). It
suggests how roles, power and responsibilities are distributed, controlled and coor-
dinated. Furthermore, it shapes behaviour by providing individuals with ‘a sys-
tematic and predictable selection of problems, solutions and choice opportunities’
(March and Olsen, 1976: 13). While organizational structure does not necessarily
predict or determine actual decision-making behaviour, it does make some choices
become more likely than others (e.g. Egeberg and Trondal, 2018). As such, orga-
nization theory builds on decision theory, with its focus on explaining decision-
making behaviour (Simon, 1976). This entails that organizational capacities do not
impact directly on society; rather, they have an indirect effect by influencing the
policy process and the decisions made within and outside organizations (Ahrne
and Brunsson, 2019). Bounded rationality (Simon, 1976) is one of three key mech-
anisms that connect role expectations to behaviour: the organizational structure
helps simplify actors’ cognitive worlds by directing attention towards a selection of
possible problems and solutions, as well as ways to connect them. This concept
holds that decision-makers operate under three restrictions disregarded by the
‘consequentialist theology’ of economic man (March, 2020: 120): limited
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information with regards to possible solutions and alternatives; limited cognitive
capacity to evaluate and process information; and limited time to make decisions.
Consequently, actors opt for a selection of satisfactory alternatives instead of
optimal ones and often turn to their immediate environments and available knowl-
edge to find proper choices (Simon, 1976). The second mechanism – the logic of
appropriateness – views human action as driven by internalized perceptions of
what is deemed appropriate (March and Olsen, 1989). Finally, actors may find
that rule and role compliance is in accordance with their self-interest and utility
functions. Organizations are thus incentive systems that administer rewards and
punishments (e.g. Ostrom, 2015; Simon, 1983).
Therefore, the national adoption of EU-level AI policy is likely to be biased by
existing organizational capacities at the national level, which are likely to vary
among the Nordic countries contingent on varying organizational capacities in
their implementation structures. A second proposition might thus be derived:
P2: National policymakers in the field of AI are likely to be simultaneously
constrained and enabled by existing organizational capacities. Thereby, policy adop-
tion is likely to be positively associated with the national organizational capacities
at hand.
Methodology and data
To map the AI policy at the EU level and the corresponding national-level policy
adoption in the Nordic states, a mixed-methods approach has been utilized in a
three-step process. First, AI strategies from the Nordic countries were read and
summarized in terms of general thrust. These documents were searched in terms of
‘EU references’. The search terms chosen were ‘EU’, ‘trustworthy’, ‘expert group’,
‘European’ and ‘Commission’. The result of the NVivo search queries were then
tabulated and graphed. In addition, the results of a policy document analysis were
used as information to create a semi-structured interview guide geared towards
government officials and key stakeholders in national AI policy processes in the
Nordic countries. Informants are indicated by the first letter of their country of
origin (e.g. ‘F’ for Finland) followed by a number that specifies the interviewee.
Table 1 illustrates the data collection.
Table 1. Distribution of data sources.
Sweden Denmark Finland Iceland Norway
Interviews x x x
Parliament web search x x x x x
Government web search x x x x x
Document analysis x x x x
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Interviews with key informants were facilitated through online video-
conferencing software available with respect to specific privacy regulation in the
specific government (Skype, Microsoft Teams and Zoom). The interviews were
conducted between March and June 2020, which was during the first major
wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, making it hard to get a hold of informants.
A total of N¼ 7 interviews were conducted with government officials and stake-
holders central to the AI policy process in Sweden, Norway and Finland. Third, a
systematic search on Nordic government web pages was conducted, with ‘artificial
intelligence’ translated into the native languages1 and used as a search query on
both parliament and government web pages.
Two caveats are worth highlighting. As contemporary governance takes place
in a multi-stakeholder environment, many initiatives in AI are presumably initi-
ated by actors outside governments. Yet, this article is limited to the study to
AI policy strategies in the core executive of the state. Second, relating to the
novelty of AI policy, it remains to be seen whether adopting the EU policy
approach will foster more integrated AI policy within the Nordic countries
over time. However, the value added is to theoretically illuminate policy dynamics
and causal mechanisms at play between ideational policy framing and organiza-
tional capacities.
Findings
This section starts by summarizing the main findings and then explores the data in
greater detail in the subsequent subsections. Summarily, we find evidence to sup-
port both theoretical propositions, namely, that the Nordic countries are ideation-
ally influenced by the EU in the creation of their AI policies (P1), and that
organizational capacity at the national level mediates the scope and depth of
policy adoption (P2). We conclude by observing that: there has been an increased
policy discourse on AI in Nordic governments and parliaments; all Nordic states
except Iceland have created AI strategies; and these AI strategies show substantial
discursive similarity with the EU policy approach, meaning that the EU has been
influential in promoting a coordinated AI framework. Furthermore, observing
variation in national-level organizational capacities across the Nordic countries,
the data also suggest that AI policy adoption is mediated by existing organization-
al capacities.
Results of the systematic web and NVivo search
Through a systematized web searching of the web pages of Nordic country parlia-
ments and governments, we observe that AI was increasingly mentioned in the late
2010s. This is shown in Figures 2 and 3. Chronologically, this also largely corre-
sponds to EU-level developments: when AI is on the agenda in the EU, it is also on
the agenda in the Nordic countries.
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The fact that the Nordic countries and the Commission increasingly addressed
AI policy especially after 2017 does not by itself suggest that Nordic countries have
been adopting EU-level AI policy; rather, this could simply reflect global AI
developments at the time. Therefore, as a second step, an NVivo word query
was conducted within all Nordic AI policies, looking for ‘Europe-specific’ refer-
ences. Indicating the adoption of EU policies by Nordic countries, we see a sub-
stantial increase in word frequency after 2018 at the time when the EU published
its coordinated AI policy. Even though some of the keywords exist in former policy
Figure 2. Nordic governments mentioning “artificial intelligence” 2010-2019
Figure 3. Nordic parliaments mentioning of “artificial intelligence”, 2010 to 2019
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documents, the bulk of the referencing to EU policy is found after 2018. Figure 4
shows all national AI policies and how much they referenced each search word.
Results from interviews and policy document analysis
This subsection shows the results from reading and summarizing the national AI
strategies, as well as results from our interviews with key informants in Finland,
Sweden and Norway. All national AI strategies equally commit to the idea that AI
is a disruptive technology and that their respective government should do their best
to harness the technology’s potential. All strategies also outline measures for
improving investments in AI, as well as its successful implementation. Building
on country-specific strengths, the strategies outline how the respective countries
should be forerunners, expanding on the temporal urgency promoted by the
Commission. The main gist of the national strategies is thus coherent with the
EU policy frame. Table 2 shows the characteristics of the Nordic AI policies.
Moreover, Table 2 shows that AI policy documents vary in both their lengths
and their ministerial embeddedness. In short, domestic AI policies are supplied by
different organizational capacities in different countries. Consequently, we see a
significant page-range difference between Sweden’s 12-page AI policy document
and Finland’s total of 270 pages published in three AI policy documents. This
variation arguably reflects variation in available national organizational capacities.
Figure 4. Nordic AI strategies references to European discourse
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Different countries have different capacities to draft their AI policy in policy
documents.
Finland. Many observations suggest that Finland is an eager adopter of AI policy.
The Finnish government has issued three AI reports that cover different areas of
AI and sketch out the road ahead for Finland. The final report of the Finnish AI
strategy includes an organizational chart of the AI programme (see Figure 5).
A first observation regards the size of the organizational structure. The sheer
size of this organization suggests requisite organizational capacities that would
enable the adoption of the EU AI policy. A second observation regards the
multi-stakeholder steering group reporting to the Minister of Economic Affairs.
The steering group is characterized by a high degree of corporate representation,
while the secretariat is represented by government officials. The organizational
structure is further divided into five subgroups that oversee five different themes
deemed relevant for the AI strategy. In these different groups, we also see a mix of
corporate and governmental representation.
When asked about the relationship between the Finnish AI strategy and the EU
AI policy, F1 drew attention to the fact that the Finnish were early adopters of AI
policy and could thus influence central-level EU policy. Moreover, the Chairman
of the Finnish AI Strategy Group was also the chairman of the AIHLEG:
F1: The relationship was most concretely through the Chairman of both groups,
Pekka Ala Pietil€a . . .he was the closest link and I think that he was elected for the
Table 2. Overview of Nordic national AI strategies.
Country Name of strategy Year Pages Responsible ministry
Denmark National Strategy for Artificial
Intelligence
2019 70 Ministry of Finance/Ministry
of Industry, Business and
Financial Affairs
Finland Finland’s Age of Artificial
Intelligence
Work in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence








Ministry of Economic Affairs
and Employment
Norway National Strategy for Artificial
Intelligence
2020 67 Ministry of Local
Government and
Modernisation
Sweden National Approach to Artificial
Intelligence
2018 12 Ministry of Enterprise and
Innovation
Sources: KMD (2020), Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland (2017, 2018, 2019), Ministry of
Enterprise and Innovation of Sweden (2018) and Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry, Business and
Financial Affairs of Denmark (2019).
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AIHLEG based on his work on the Finnish AI Strategy Group . . . in a sense, the
Finnish Strategy Group was somehow driving the work in the AIHLEG.
Q: So, you mean that the Finnish AI Strategy Group had influence over the EU
policymaking?
F1: Certain influence yes for sure and partially due to the fact that we were maybe
one or two steps ahead of some others.
Summing up the Finnish case, it features considerable organizational capacity for
AI policymaking at the national level. These observations suggest that, in sum,
Finland has been tightly coupled to the EU approach to AI. Their decision to take
on AI early and create requisite organizational capacities supports our second
proposition: that organizational capacities at the national level seem to increase
EU-level policy adoption, as well as participation – indeed, Finnish AI policy
experts have even been responsible for formulating the AI policy agenda of the
EU (F1). The stark political determination by the Finnish government was also
confirmed by a Swedish interviewee (S2). An example of the political determina-
tion and creativity of the Finnish government is the widely recognized introductory
Figure 5. Organizational capacities in the Finnish government
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland (2019, p. 45).
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online course on AI, ‘Elements of AI’, which has reached over 550,000 people at
the time of writing (see: www.elementsofai.se).
Norway. Norway is a case that features relatively weak organizational capacities in
AI policy formulation. As an associated EU member, this suggests that Norwegian
AI policy is less likely to adopt EU AI policy. In Norway, AI policymaking has
been organized as a writing group consisting of four people from one ministry and
a government agency, as well as an interdepartmental working group for feedback
on the strategy work. Considering how relatively late the Norwegian AI strategy
was published, one informant experienced a stark push not just from the EU, but
also from civil society and from within the ministry, and emphasized the fact
that Sweden, Denmark and Finland had already published their own AI strategies
(N1, N4):
There was a push from the industry organizations in Norway. When Denmark’s
strategy came out, it was very much the case that, ‘Sweden has, Denmark has –
just not us’. This created an agenda – they had an agenda. . .. If we internally had
no AI strategy, we would float without control as a country. We were not so worried
about that. We worked towards the EU initiatives – most [of these] areas we already
worked on even though they were not gathered in a strategy document. (N1)
As observed in Figure 4, the Norwegian AI strategy has made extensive reference
to the Commission’s AI policy. Illustrative of this is the fact that the Norwegian AI
strategy borrows the definition of AI from the AIHLEG and that the strategy
tightly couples itself to the EU policy approach on AI. Trustworthiness is a key
concept established by the AIHLEG and the extensive use of the word in the
Norwegian AI strategy can thus be considered an indication of discursive coupling
with the EU. Furthermore, the ethical principles suggested by the AIHLEG are
given a complete section in this document (KMD, 2020: 58–61). When asked
whether the Norwegian AI strategy was inspired by the EU level, N1 confirms
that they looked to the Commission to a large extent, especially the AIHLEG:
It has been proven that our strategy covers the areas where the Commission has called
for. It is a kind of order to the member states in the coordinated plan and that the
strategy created should cover specific areas. Basically, they cover those areas. The
Commission has also been busy positioning the EU vis-a-vis China and the United
States, and to make visible a major investment in Europe. They have been very much
looking for ‘numbers’ – quantification of research, investments, study places,
candidates.
However, when it comes to the actual framing of the Norwegian AI strategy, N1
also referred to the other Nordic countries regarding policy inputs. It was deemed
relevant to also get inspiration from neighbouring countries:
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The Danish strategy or what has been done in Finland has been more relevant as
inspiration than what the EU has done. We meet Denmark, Sweden and Finland, the
meetings arranged by the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) and they are the same
people you meet in the EU.
In sum, the late publishing of the Norwegian AI strategy in 2020 and the extensive
referencing of the EU policy documents suggest that the Norwegian AI policy was
profoundly adapted to and informed by the EU’s AI policy. This finding was
confirmed by our informant, who also emphasized that the strategy is basically
a document in line with what the EC ‘ordered’ in the coordinated plan from 2018.
A high degree of national policy adoption from the EU is primarily explained in
this case by ideational policy adoption, partly due to weak national organizational
capacities for policy development. Still, the Norwegian maritime authorities
started their first testbed for autonomous vessels in 2016 and two more have
been approved since then. The strategy suggests many developments and invest-
ment measures. A stark increase in spending on R&D was announced and one
initiative suggests implementing programming and computational thinking skills
in primary school mathematics and natural sciences. Given time, such initiatives
could build immense capacity and it is thus rather early to predict the outcomes of
such policy developments.
Sweden. The Swedish case is partly different from other Nordic countries with
regards to AI policy in two regards: as emphasized by interviewee S2, the
Swedish government decided to define the Swedish policy not as a ‘strategy’, but
as an ‘approach’, and the length of the document is only 12 pages. One Swedish
informant reported the following regarding the strategy and its coupling with
the EU:
My own opinion is that we are quite governed by the EU and what they do. We
respond to it when it has happened.. . . We [referring to the government offices in
Sweden] do not have many deliveries on AI. There is the AI approach but we do not
have an in-depth strategy or a target programme that many other countries have.
Sometimes you talk about [the national approach] as a strategy, but if you are to be
completely correct, it is an approach. (S2)
The document also reflects the scarce organizational capacities of the Swedish
government on AI policymaking. With regards to organizational capacities, the
Swedish policy structure is fairly similar to that in Norway: small and actively
involving very few government officials. According to S2, the actual writing pro-
cess involved consultation processes with all relevant ministries but only two gov-
ernment officials. The government offices of Sweden was consulted on the AI
‘approach’ and, according to S2, the policy was the result of a consensus among
all relevant ministries. Yet, stakeholders (S1, S3) characterized the Swedish AI
policy in general as lacking leadership. It was referred to as a ‘let a thousand
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flowers bloom’ approach, with laissez faire leadership and not really focusing on
AI. Interviewee S2 further reflected on the fact that several ministers had discussed
AI at different policy arenas, highlighting that AI was a mainstream technology
and should therefore be a decentralized competence across ministries instead of a
coordinated policy domain of the government:
I perceive that the pressure on the government offices comes from others doing some-
thing that we act on, so that EU’s AI white paper will, of course, have a big impact.
As we do not have a clear strategy and roadmap, other documents will fill that gap.
When the EU says we should do these things, we react to it, but we do it when it
happens. (S2)
As the Swedish AI strategy was published in 2017, before the EU presented its AI
policy, the Swedish document includes little references to the EU’s AI policy.
Moreover, reflecting weak organizational capacities, the Swedish AI document is
also by far the shortest strategy document of the Nordic countries. As our infor-
mant emphasized, the competences on AI in the Swedish government offices are
dispersed across several ministries, and the national AI policy approach is the
result of a consensus among different parts of the government and not crafted
by one lead ministry. The Swedish case thus features both weak ideational policy
adoption from the EU and weak organizational capacities at the national level.
As our informant pointed out, the government offices do not have many deliv-
eries on AI, responsibilities have been delegated to governmental agencies, suggest-
ing a decentralized mode of governance. In 2017, the Swedish innovation agency
(Vinnova) was assigned by the government to map out and analyse the implemen-
tation and potential of AI in Sweden. In 2019, the Swedish Agency for Digital
Government (DIGG) was tasked with analysing how AI could contribute to effi-
cient applications in the public sector. In 2019, Statistics Sweden (SCB) was tasked
with analysing the use of AI in Sweden. Also in 2019, the big corporation
Wallenberg established a separate AI programme (WASP), awarding SEK4.2 bil-
lion to AI research in Sweden over 10 years, both within the industrial sector and
within social science. In sum, the Swedish case features an organizationally decen-
tralized design on AI policy adoption.
Conclusions
This study suggests that the Commission has successfully utilized ideational strat-
egies to stimulate a coordinated European AI policy framework within the Nordic
countries. Through concrete and persuasive discourses, the Commission has mobi-
lized actors such as the AIHLEG and applied ideational power to define the range
of possibilities of the policy responses, as well as the content of such policies,
showing a clear case of agenda setting. This has also caused member states and
affiliated states such as Norway to create national AI strategies and to adapt their
approaches to key tenets of EU policy discourse. However, differentiated
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organizational capacities across the Nordic states has caused differentiated policy
adoption. Policy documents are arranged under different ministries and are of
different lengths and detail, suggesting that policy framing at the EU level is fil-
tered through organizational structures at the national level. So, while the EU’s AI
framing has penetrated and formed both the form (strategies or strategy-like texts)
and the content (central tenets) of Nordic AI policies, the study also observes
differentiation along the lines of organizational capacity. Member states that
lack organizational capacity are likely to foster weak policy implementation.
Thus, great hopes in Brussels are partly dashed in some national capitals. On
the contrary, when requisite organizational capacities are installed in member
states – as in the case of Finland – we find that EU policies on AI are more
robustly adopted.
The study provides insight into the interdependent elements of policymaking
and the much-debated notion of transnational actors’ role in national policy-
making (see Orenstein, 2008; Stone, 2008), as well as the critiqued (James and
Lodge, 2003) notion of policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). The study
shows that AI policy is not created in a vacuum. Policymakers at the govern-
mental level look towards both the EU and neighbouring countries when estab-
lishing their own policies. Even EU-level policymakers might strengthen their
own policy expertise by recruiting expertise from early adopters, as exemplified
by the Finnish case. Such processes can lead to mimetic policy processes and
ideational diffusion, but organizational capacities curtail such processes by shap-
ing the process of policy implementation. As eloquently described by Beland
(2009: 701), ‘national institutions and repertoires remain central to the politics
of policy change despite the undeniable role of transnational actors and
processes’.
As a case of EU policymaking, the study also refers to the idea of European
administrative integration. Studies of European administrative ‘space’ (see Olsen,
2003; Trondal and Peters, 2013) and ‘community’ (see Siedentopf and Speer, 2003)
have been interested in studying administrative interdependence and policy coor-
dination across levels of governance. In the face of more salient political debates
and contemporary struggles of the EU (i.e. Brexit, COVID-19 and Eurosceptic
populism), this study shows that the Commission’s administrative apparatus
robustly coordinates policy through framing despite the perceived ‘crises’ of the
EU. The fact that the Commission is venturing into a novel policy area and man-
aged to facilitate a coordinated policy framework shows both a forward-looking
and robust side of European administrative integration that systematically ‘chugs
along’ in the face of political turbulence and crises.
Since the evidence of this article is empirically suggestive, further data collection
is important. It would be of relevance to further study the intricacies of how
European policymakers learn from each other within the policy field of AI.
Whereas this study covers the Nordic countries, it would also be interesting to
expand the empirical scope beyond this. Finally, as AI computers – such as neural
networks – are becoming increasingly autonomously ‘intelligent’, their decisions
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also increasingly challenge human oversight. Since this development is increasingly
discussed in the referred policies in terms of ethical guidelines and sound
principles for decision-making, future research might examine how computational
decision-making might pose challenges for the legitimate implementation of
public policy.
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